Michigan Law Review
Volume 53

Issue 6

1955

Adequacy of Instructions to the Jury: II
Curtis Wright Jr.
Temple University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Courts Commons

Recommended Citation
Curtis Wright Jr., Adequacy of Instructions to the Jury: II, 53 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1955).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol53/iss6/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1955]

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

813

ADEQUACY OF INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY: II*

Curtis Wright, Jr.
FIFTH

t

CmcuIT STATES

Georgia, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Alabama, Florida

T

six states in this group present some very special cases. They
range from an original colony to Florida and Texas, which were
admitted to statehood in 1845. National rank in population varies
from sixth (Texas) to twenty-sixth (Mississippi) with the average almost within the top one-third. As to increase of population, the mean
is close to the national figure of fifteen percent. That statement needs
qualification, however, since Florida increased 46 percent and Texas
20 percent, whereas Mississippi had an actual loss of two percent. No
docket delay of more than six months is found anywhere except in
Texas, but some real congestion is evident there.170
None of these states could be called "code" in the sense of having
followed the wave of imitation of the Field Code of New York-each
having worked out its own system of regulation of procedure. At
present, no judicial (supervisory) rule-making is known to exist in
Louisiana or Mississippi, and the power is very limited 1n Alabama.
Although the legislature still holds the leash in the other states, there
has been judicial rule-making as to instructions in Georgia, Texas and
Florida.
Instructions are given at the approved time (after argument) except
in Mississippi and Texas, and written instructions are required only in
those two states. In Alabama, to the contrary, it is mandatory that the
general charge be oral. In Florida and Louisiana the charge may be
oral unless the parties request that it be in writing; in Georgia the instructions are considered written if they are stenographically reported.171 In none of these states is the court permitted to summarize
or comment on the evidence. In this latter connection the heavy hand
HE

" Part I was published in the February 1955 issue. Two other articles written by the
author in conjunction with the present article and published elsewhere are cited fully in
notes 4 and 8 supra [53 MICH. L. REv. 505 at 506 and 507 (1955)].-Ed.
t Associate Professor, Temple University School of Law.-Ed.
170 Houston and EI Paso, 18 months; San Antonio, 12 months; Dallas, 9 months.
171 Ga. Code Ann. (1937) §81-1102 (amended by Act 1943, p. 262). When such
provision is present, "it seems almost misleading to speak of the jurisdiction as requiring
written instructions. See Stone, ''Instructions to Juries: A Survey of the General Field," 26
WASH, Umv. L.Q. 455 (1941) as to the term "written instructions."
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of the constitutions and legislation of the Reconstruction period is most
apparent.172
Georgia

Georgia is slowly £ghting its way back toward recovery from a
particularistic plague of procedural "points," scattered throughout the
reports. The rule-making of 1947 is a step forward, but the annotations of cases under the statute-rules still reveal the wreckage of entirely too many verdicts for errors of omission and commission in instructions.1 73
The system has elements of the Tennessee mechanics designed to
insure that the general charge be of judicial authorship. As elsewhere
on the eastern seaboard, furthermore, counsel do not see the charge beforehand.17 4
The aid of a local practice book is indispensable to investigation of
attitudes toward adequacy. One guidebook, for instance, classifies the
duty to charge sua sponte under When Error, Failure to Chargewith subheadings such as Essential Law, Controlling Law, Principle
Necessarily Involved-and so on through Vital, Main, Substantial,
Material and the like.175 More cases are collected in a note of the
1920's in the Michigan Law Review.176 It displayed seven seemingly
irreconcilable Georgia cases from one 1924 volume of the Southeastern
Reports. Four were reversed, three affirmed-and difficulties are exhibited by the comparisons. The note writer pointed out that the
roughhewn justice of an uninstructed jury must somehow be kept in
balance with the counter tendency "that parties will be encouraged to
lie in wait and ambush an unwary judge." That the problem cannot
be solved entirely by the decision of cases point-by-point is admitted
172 Norris v. Clinkscales, 47 S.C. 488 at 505, 25 S.E. 797 (1896); ROBINSON, JusnCB
GREY 616 (1941).
173 Notes 177, 178 infra. See Pound, "Some Parallels From Legal History," 49 A.B.A.
REP. 204 at 205 (1924).
174Tennessee, note 169 supra [53 M:rcH. L. REv. 505 at 539]. Requests to charge
may be made at any time before the jury retires to consider its verdict: Ga. Code Ann.
(1937) §81-1101. As to Georgia instructions generally: 1954 WASH. Umv. L.Q. 191-192.
175 CoZART, GEORGIA PRACTICE RULI!s, 3d ed., §§664-667 (1933). The annotations
to Ga. Code Ann. (1937) §81-1101 collect numerous cases as to necessity for requests. It
is nevertheless error to fail to charge, regardless of requests, on the essential law of the case,
Louisville & W. R. Co. v. Hall, 106 Ga. 786, 32 S.E. 860 (1899); Southern Ry. Co. v.
O'Bryan, 112 Ga. 127, 37 S.E. 161 (1900). But see Wood v. Claxton, 199 Ga. 809, 35
S.E. (2d) 455 (1945).
176 23 M:rcH. L. REv. 276 (1925) (criminal cases). Cases are collected also in
Barnes v. Thomas, 72 Ga. App. 827, 35 S.E. (2d) 364 (1945).
IN

1955]

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY

815

(as applied to procedure generally) by the prefaces to the respective
editions of the practice book heretofore cited.177 There is evidence in
the cases themselves, for that matter, that 40 to 50 percent of the cases
tried in the courts of Georgia formerly, at least, turned on points of
practice.1 78

Mississippi
There is no room for discussion of adequacy of the charge as to
Mississippi since the rule for eighty years has been that the court has
no power to give any instructions other than the requests of counsel.179
The casebooks and texts on procedure often point to this interpretation
of statute as the complete end of the road in literalness of statute-interpretation. The new practice act does not reach this problem, but invaluable historical explanations of the state practice are to be found in
a 1948 article describing the new procedure.180

Louisiana

Jury trials cause "little trouble" under the unusual Louisiana Constitution. The matter may be summed up in two quotations from
Louisiana writings:
"Under our constitution appeals are on both the law and the
facts in civil cases and . . . few cases are remanded for retrial except where more testimony is needed for the appellate decision." 181
'When the Supreme Court has the facts before it and are passing on the merits of the case, they will not notice irregularities in
the charge to the jury."182
177CoZART, GEORGIA PRACTICE RuLEs, 3d ed. (1933): "The vast number of rules
and their intricacy and complexity make the practice of law in Georgia extremely difficult;
nay, to many lawyers, this field of law is terra incognita. • • • At least one-half of the cases
tried in the courts of Georgia involve or turn on questions of practice. • • ." Introduction
to 3d ed. See also Introduction to Cozart's 1st ed. (1918).
178 Cobb, J., in Kelly v. Strouse, 116 Ga. 872 at 898, 43 S.E. 280 (1903). Cf.
Pound, "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice," 29
A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906), reprinted, 20 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 178 (1937).
179 Miss. Code (1942) §1530; Jones v. State, 216 Miss. 186, 62 S. (2d) 217 (1953);
Masonite Corp. v. Lochridge, 163 Miss. 364, 141 S. 758 (1932); Archer v. Sinclair, 49
Miss. 343 (1873); Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 389 (1856).
180 Griffith, "The New Mississippi Civil Practice Act,'' 20 Mrss. L.J. 1 (1948).
181 Bailey, "Jury Trial No Burden in Louisiana,'' 13 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 47 (1929);
generally, La. Civ. Code, 1870 revision, 2d ed., arts. 494-592 (1951). See Miller, "Minimum Judicial Procedural Standards-How Met in Louisiana,'' 9 LA. L. REv. 382 at 393
(1949).
182 2 NEW LA. Dm. §653 (1950) (cases collected back to 1816); Hoffman v. Ackermann, llO La. 1070, 35 S. 293 (1903); Regan v. Adams Exp. Co., 49 La. Ann. Rep.
1579, 22 s. 835 (1897).
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In view of that system, the occasional statements of the cases that
the judge "must" charge the jury on the law are, for present purposes,
simple statements of general principles.183 Louisiana is nevertheless
shown faint-ruled on the map,184 in deference to the fact that appeals
are at least confined to the merits. The result makes an appeal amount
to a waiver of .trial by jury, however. Yet one must remember that the
statutory special verdict ( developed and used particularly in Wisconsin)
provides that as to matters not presented by the questions submitted by
counsel, there is deemed to have been a waiver of jury trial.185

Texas
Mention of special verdicts brings one to the great State of Texas,
which might well claim that the Wisconsin special verdict is simply a
borrowing from the Texas special issues.186 More generally as to instructions, however, it is to be noticed that in 1941 a complete revision
of procedure became effective under the stimulus of'the federal rules.187
Rule 274 makes it necessary that objections and requests be called to
the court's attention with specificity and clearly shows the "beneficent
contagion" of federal rule 51.188 The reports of the proceedings which
paved the way to the adoption of these rules should be seen in the
present connection. They state some of the best arguments anywhere
to be found as to the abuses, and "the discouraging reversals that follow
in the wake of any other rule." It was those abuses and discouragements that "the new rule was designed to curb."189
1 83 Spofford v. Pemberton, 12 Rob. (La.) 162 (1845). See as to limitations on charge:
State v. King, 135 La. 117, 64 S. 1007 (1914).
184 See Part I, 53 MICH. L. Rllv. 505 at 515.
1 85 Wis. Stat. (1951) §270.28; Rosenberry, "Recent Pr9gress in Judicial Procedure
and Administration in Wisconsin," 45 A.B.A. REP. 372 (1920); MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE oF THB TRIAL CounT IN HisToRICAL PERSPECTIVE 320 (1952).
186 "In 1897 ••• Texas produced the true key to the [special verdict] situation. Ten
years later Wisconsin remodeled its special verdict statute by availing itself of the Texas
principle. •••" MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE oF nm TRIAL CounT IN HisTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 319 (1952).
187 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated under the rule-making power of the
Supreme Court per Texas Constitution of 1876 and effective on the last day of 1941. See
Stayton, Foreword, VERNoN's TEXAS RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1942); Clark, ''The
Texas and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," 20 Tm:. L. Rllv. 4 (1941).
188 Stayton, foreword, VERNON'S TEXAS RuLEs OF CrvrL PROCEDURE (1942);
MILLAR, ClvIL PROCEDURE oF THE TRIAL CounT IN HisTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 62 (1952).
189 See especially, lecture of J. P. Alexander before the Judicial Section, State Bar of
Texas, presenting reasons supporting the new requirements of timely and specific objections in annotation to rule 274 in VERNON'S TEXAS RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1942).
The provisions of rule 274 to that effect have been upheld by the supreme court: Larson
v. Ellison, 147 Tex. 465, 217 S.W. (2d) 420 (1949), and by the court of civil appeals:
Safety Casualty Co. v. Link, (Tex. 1948) 209 S.W. (2d) 391 at 395; Reddick v. Jackson,
(Tex. 1949) 218 S.W. (2d) 212 at 213.
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Alabama
Alabama mechanics are closer to those of Georgia than any so far
seen, and resemble those which will appear later under South Carolina.
It has one of the "may charge" statutes, however, and the judicial duty
is low.100 In this respect it seems to resemble Virginia to its east, or
Arkansas to the west. The :8avor of the oral general charge can be
gained by seeing the model charge set out in full in the recently published Alabama Circuit Judge's Handbook. 191 While the court speaks
to the jurors in the :first person, and addresses them in the second, one
cannot avoid concern as to whether much of the charge conveys meaning to its audience.192 Despite the obvious efforts of the court to "put
across" the legal propositions necessary for the jury to apply, it is doubtful whether much of the charge can be referable, in the jury's mind,
to any basis of experience or knowledge. That query, however, is applicable to instructions to the jury generally, and is no reflection on the
excellent charge for which we are indebted to the compiler of the handbook. The state is shown in bold ruling on the map by reason of certain rather extreme applications of the low duty principle,193 the strict
repression of the trial judge,1 94 and too many appeals on instructionsthe latter doubtless due to what the Alabama Judicial Council has called
the "written instructions vice."195

Florida
Florida had tried the code back in the "inauspicious Reconstruction
days" of 1870, but returned to a modified common law system after a
190 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 7, §270; Claude Jones & Son v. Lair, 245 Ala. 441 at 447,
17 S. (2d) 577 (1944); St. Louis-S.F. R. Co. v. Norwood, 222 Ala. 464 at 466, 133 S.
27 (1931). See McPherson v. State, 198 Ala. 5 at 6, 73 S. 387 (1916). See generally,
1954 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 195-196.
191 By Hon. Walter B. Jones, Presiding Judge 15th Judicial Circuit of Alabama: "Oral
Charge to the Jury in a Negligence Case," A:u.BAMA Cmcurr JUDGES' HANDBOOK 145153 (1953).
192 1d. at 153: "Now at the request of the Plaintiff, I give you the following charges
in writing.•••" Expectably, such written charges of counsel are technical. As to the general, court-prepared charge, however, it is emphasized that such is an ideal charge-selected
for attention here by reason of its superiority. But can laymen be expected to follow even
this excellent charge upon its first reading?
193 Southern Bldg. & Loan v. Davis, 223 Ala. 222, 135 S. 164 (1931); Southern
Bldg. & Loan v. Wales, 24 Ala. App. 542, 138 S. 553 (1931). See McPherson v. State,
198 Ala. 5, 73 S. 387 (1916).
194 ''The numerous and oft recurring reversals of judgments, because of instructions
deemed to invade the province of the jury, manifest the care and vigilance the court
exercises.••." Brown v. State, 109 Ala. 70 at 79, 20 S. 103 (1896).
195 Jones, "The Trial Judge's Charge to the Jury," 15 ALA. LAWYER 143 at 144
(1954).
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three-year trial.196 In 1949, however, it finally achieved a set of procedural rules based on the federal system.197 The new common law
rule 39 toughens up the practice as to requests and objections in conjunction with a provision for settlement of instructions.198 A series of
cases since have gone right down the line in upholding the new rulewith one superficially strange exception.
Such is shown in a case where the court had inexplicably failed to
hold the presettlement conference. While it in no way appears that
counsel did not have a chance to make objection at the close of the
charge, he did not in fact state any objections. He was nevertheless
permitted to assert error on appeal.1 99 At first this case might seem to
stand for mandatory presettlement; it would seem that the omission of
settlement conference creates a vested right in error. A more natural
(however speculative) reason can be found, however, if one considers
the seventy-five year common law background upon which the new
rules are superimposed. The common law practice must have relied
upon viewpoints like those of Messrs. Chitty and Tidd. It was the
position of the,latter that while it was quite necessary to make one's
objections at the close of the- charge, t:pe task was stated by them as
being a difficult, painful, and dangerous one.200 It is conceivable that
196 CLABX,
197 30 Fla.

Com! PLEADING, 2d ed., 26 (1947).
Stat. Ann. (1950) foreword, Rules of Common Law. For background,
history and large bibliography, see CLABX, ConE PLEADING, 2d ed., 52, and n. 148 (1947).
198 The pertinent portion thereof is 39(b) which provides: "Not later than at the
close of the evidence, or at such earlier time during the trial as the Court may reasonably
direct, it shall be the duty of parties to the cause to file written requests that the Court
instruct the jury on the law as set forth in such requests. The Court shall then require
counsel to appear before it for the purpose of a conference to settle the instructions to be
given. At such conference all objections shall be made and ruled upon and the Court shall
likewise inform counsel at said conference of such general instructions as it will give. No
party may assign as error the giving of any instruction unless he objects thereto at such
time, nor the failure to give an instruction unless he shall have requested the same. The
Court shall instruct the jury after the arguments are completed."
199 Tampa Transit Lines, Inc. v. Corbin, (Fla. 1952) 62 S. (2d) 10. Note, however,
that writer does not imply that same is necessarily contra to the aforesaid series of cases
upholding rule 39(b), being Eli Witt Cigar and Tobacco Co. v. Matatics, (Fla. 1951) 55
S. (2d) 549; Adams v. Royal Exchange Assur., (Fla. 1952) 62 S. (2d) 591; Dowling v.
Loftin, (Fla. 1954) 72 S. (2d) 283.
200 "If the judge • • . misstate the law or misdirect the jury in any respect • . • it is
the duty of the leading counsel immediately to state the objection, and if he do not, the
Court will not, on motion, grant a new trial; and, therefore, however painful the duty, and
in some cases heretofore perhaps dangerous (as regards the subsequent observations of the
judge on the merits), yet it is imperative on counsel, if at all, to object at the time, or
lose the effect of the objection, and be precluded from supporting a motion for new trial,"
3 Cmm, PRACTICE 914 (1836). See discussion of the common law practice as to Delaware,
citing same English authorities, in Buckley v. Johnson & Co., 41 Del. 546 at 558, 25 A
(2d) 392 (1942).
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the Florida courts are amenable to excusing counsel from that duty as
a matter of courtesy. It must be remembered that the nearby state of
South Carolina has held, by its supreme court, that counsel need not be
put in the embarrassing position of calling the court's error to its attention in open court at the conclusion of the charge.201
While the cases over the years have not placed much emphasis on
the judicial duty to charge,202 the doctrine of fundamental error was
recognized not too long ago in a criminal case where there was an
omission of charge on the burden of proof.203 The cases seem to indicate that on the civil side the chief difficulties are caused by too many
requests to charge, however, rather than too few. 204
There is an intimation or so that a general objection might suffice
to preserve error of commission in the charge, but it is too soon to
determine under what circumstances such would be the case, and how
severe such error would have to be.2015 Generally, however, the improvement brought about by the new rules is very apparent in the
decisions since 1949, and Florida is shown in light ruling on the map.
Three states here have been shown to have made reasonably satisfactory solution of the adequacy problem: Louisiana, ·Texas, and Florida. Louisiana defies comparison with other states, of course, but is
included in this group because the unusual scope of its appeal is thoughtprovoking. Appeal is largely a retrial based on the written record-but
at least it goes to the merits and offers a comparative study with the
Civilian system without necessity for looking to the law of other
countries.206
Texas shows the familiar phenomenon of another fast-growing
state turning to the federal rules system. Its use of special issues affords
much of interest-but one also wonders whether it is more than a
coincidence that the three states which make the most use of special
201

Steinberg v. South Carolina Power Co., 165 S.C. 367, 163 S.E. 881 (1932).
Carter v. Bennett, 4 Fla. 283 at 341 (1852); Lungren v. Brownlie, 22 Fla. 491
at 493 (1886); Howland v. Morris, 143 Fla. 189, 196 S. 472 (1940); Stewart v. State,
158 Fla. 121, 27 S. (2d) 752 (1946); 7 ENcYc. Dm. OF FLA. ful?TS. (Recompiled),
Instructions, §7a (1952).
203 Robinson v. Town of Riviera, 157 Fla. 194, 25 S. (2d) 277 (1946).
204 See the plentiful evidence to this effect in §7 of the TucEsT OF FLORIDA REPORTS,
note 201 supra.
2 os Bradley v. Associates Discount Corp., (Fla. 1952) 58 S. (2d) 857 (semble).
206 Cf. Reiss, "Lessons in Judicial Administration from European Countries," 37 J.
AM.. Jtm. Soc. 102 (1953).
202
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verdicts all show delay in getting cases to trial: Wisconsin, Texas, and
North Carolina.
Florida is growing at a rate surpassed only by California and Arizona. The procedural revolution achieved there was the result of a
twelve-year campaign of planning and study. 207 The change was foreshadowed by remarks of the Florida Supreme Court in 1940 when it
was speaking of a slightly different aspect of the federal rules:
'While to some they may seem to go too far with their liberal
practices, these rules are designed to speed up and simplify practice
in the federal courts, and do so with excellent results. In the
modern, fast-moving world the trend is toward faster m~thods of
procedure, without, of course, sacrificing any of the fundamental
rights of the parties."208

FouRTH Cmcurr

STATES

Virginia and West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Maryland

These are of course all original colonies except West Virginia,
which was carved out of the Old Dominion in 1863. While the average growth of these five states was only a shade above that of the
country as a whole, the increase in Maryland was 29 percent, and in
Virginia it was 24 percent. The mean population rank of these states
is twenty-first, North Carolina being tenth, is largest in this respect,
and West Virginia, twenty-ninth, is the smallest. With the possible
exception of West Virginia, none completely escapes the delay-in-trial
problem.209
None of these states joined the first wave of imitation of the Field
Code but, during Reconstruction, North Carolina joined up in 1868,
and South Carolina in 1870. West Virginia is now governed by code
and rules of court as to trial practice,210 whereas Virginia has no statutory provisions as to instructions-but has some supreme court rules
that bear on trial practice. South Carolina has no rule-making, whereas
to Rules in 30 Fla. Stat. Ann. (1950).
v. Morris, 143 Fla. 189 at 193, 196 S. 472 (1940).
209Virginia: Richmond, 8 months; North Carolina: Greensboro (Guilford Co.) 13
months, Charlotte (Mecklenburg Co.) 12 months; South Carolina: Greenville, 12 months;
Maryland: Baltimore, 10 months; West Virginia: Charleston, 6 months.
210 To be precise, under W.Va. Code (1949) §5183, all statutes relating to practice
have force only as rules of court subject to being altered by court action. As to W.Va.
pleading and practice generally, see CLARK, CoDE PLEADING, 2d ed., 28 ff. (1947);
CLARK, CASES ON MoDERN PLEADING 28, n. 13 (1952).
207 Foreword
208 Howland
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in Maryland the procedure as to instructions is completely governed
by rules promulgated in 1941.
The mechanics of instructions vary considerably, in that arguments
precede instructions only in North and South Carolina; written instructions are mandatory only in West Virginia, permissible in Virginia ( at
least, waiver is common as to the requirement that they be written),
and oral instructions are now customary elsewhere. Comment is
ostensibly prohibited everywhere. In Maryland, however, the court
may summarize-and the interpretations seem to be taking the line that
if he does not unfairly slip over into comment such is not necessarily
error. In North Carolina a summary of the evidence is mandatory, but
it is reversible error if the summary includes anything that may be called
comment.

Virginia and West Virginia
There is sufficient basic similarity to permit this grouping although,
as to the duty to charge, in Virginia the giving of instructions uninvited is actually condernned.211 West Virginia has statutes which
countenance it,212 and which contain a provision that the court, as an
alternative to giving the separate instructions, which are usual, "may
in writing instruct upon the law governing the case, putting such instructions in the form of an orderly and connected charge, incorporat21l "It is not the practice in Virginia to give instructions unless requested, except
where it is necessaxy to prevent a failure of justice, and, while the giving of instructions
hy the court unasked is not error if the instructions correctly propound the law, still the
practice is condemned." BURK's PLEADING AND PRAcnCB IN VmGINIA AND WEST VmGINIA, 4th ed., c. 38, §286 (1952); Blunt v. Commonwealth, 4 Leigh (31 Va.) 689
(1834); Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867 (1881); Du Pont Co. v. Snead's Achnr.,
124 Va. 177, 97 S.E. 812 (1919). But see note, 22 CoL. L. REv. 162 (1922), discussing
a line of cases which ended with Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Stock & Sons, 104 Va. 97,
51 S.E. 161 (1905), and which concerned the rather different question of the duty to
modify an equivocal request.
The attitude is that instructions are a burden which counsel cannot impose upon
the court. Womack v. Circle, 70 Va. 192 at 208 (1877); Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v.
Stock & Sons, supra this note. West Virginia: Bank v. Hannaman, 63 W.Va. 358 at 363,
60 S.E. 242 (1908); cases collected 10 M:rCHIE's VmcINIA-WEsT VmcINIA JURisPnuDBNCB §12 (1950). Some may find it interesting to see how the judges in Virginia did
not pick up the burden in the first place, and how that rule of common custom became
codified into its common law practice with the aid of early practice hooks. Catterall, "Trial
hy Jury in Virginia,'' 28 VA. L. REv. 106 at 109 (1941); Moreland, "Judge and Jury in
Virginia,'' 1924 VA. ST. B. AssN. 221 at 239; 1937 VA. ST. B. AssN., Judicial Section
session 45-57. See note 215 infra.
212 With one exception the prevailing practice as to instructions is a statutory holdover which will control procedure in the trial courts until the adoption of rules by the
supreme court under W.Va. Code (1949) §5183. See W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §§5653,
5654, 5655, and Trial Court Rule VI(e).
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ing therein the substance and, as far as may be, the language of the
instructions prayed upon either side or prepared by the court on its own
motion, with correctly propounded law applicable to the case. . . ."213
The latter must be submitted to counsel on both sides for objection, as
under the present Iowa rule.
Virginia practice is important for its influence elsewhere as well as
for its own sake, since Illinois-at least-has formally recognized that
its practice derives from the common law practice of Virginia as it
existed at the time Illinois was settled before 1818.214 Another interesting element is the way in which the laissez faire doctrine of the
judicial duty grew up-since its influence may be traced into Illinois
and possibly Arkansas in one direction, and perhaps down into Alabama and Mississippi in another. The sort of thing that comes to light
is the fact that the county trial judge, until well after the middle of the
19th century, was not a lawyer.2 ~ 6 He was more likely to have been
an intelligent farmer, before whom the lawyers addressed the jury upon
both fact and law. Therefore the instruction was simply upon a controverted point of law upon which the attorneys could not agree, and
which called for the action of the court.216

North Carolina

In North Carolina, the rule could not be more different. Not only
must the court instruct upon all the applicable law, but it must state
the contentions of the parties.217 It must summarize the facts with
complete impartiality, and without the slightest hint of comment. At
one time it was thought that the summary for the respective sides must
213 W.Va. Code Ann. (1949) §5653; Bunx's PRACTICE, 4th ed., §286, p. 520 (1952);
Atlas Realty Co. v. Momoe, 116 W.Va. 337, 180 S.E. 261 (1935). See Maxwell, ''The
Problem of Jury Instructions," 43 W.VA. L.Q. 1 (1936). Cf. §67 of the Illinois Civil
Practice Act of 1933, discussed at notes 137, 138 supra [53 MICH. L. REv. 533], and
Iowa Rule 196, note 111 supra [53 MicH. L. REv. 528].
214 People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11 at 16, 192 N.E. 634 (1934).
216 Byrd, "The Province of the Court in Jury Trials," 1907 VA. ST. B. AssN. 194 at
196. See Strode, "Oral Instructions to Juries," 1939 VA. ST. B. AssN. 359.
216 Rule making in Virginia is in progress and, while no interpretations have been
found, under Rules of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, effective February 1,
1951, as amended, rule 1:8 provides that objections (including those directed at instructions) must be made in time to permit correction and must state the grounds of objection
at the time.
217N.C. Gen. Stat. (1953) §1-180, as rewritten and amended in 1949. See, under
prior law, Mebane Graded School Dist. v. Alamance County, 211 N.C. 213, 189 S.E. 873
(1937). For discussion of the 1949 change, in particular, see 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 158-159
(1953), and 1954 WAsH. UNIV. L.Q. 193.
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be of equal length.218 It should be explained parenthetically that verdicts cannot be directed. When a judge from another circuit was first
told of those rules (equal length of summary and no directed verdict)
he exclaimed, 'What if the evidence is all on one side? When the
trial judge comes to the short side, must he say, We shall now observe
a few moments of silence in deference to section so-and-so of the
Code?'"
The rule of equality is no longer honored, although in a 1953 case
the trial judge felt it necessary to tell the jury in his charge that "it had
taken longer to give a summary of the state's evidence than the defendant's, but they were to attach no significance to that."219 And as might
have been expected, he was called to account for his "comment" ("attach no significance to that") although in this instance he was exonerated.
As to objections, there is no duty of counsel to point out error in the
summary, or to "call"_ the court for anything it deems to approach comment.220 As to errors of law, or the relating of the facts to the law, the
general rule seems to b~uite seriously-that there is no general rule.
What sort of error of omission or commission can be raised by a general
objection seems to have defied local writers who have studied the
"stockpile of judicial utterances" as it has mounted up from volume to
volume. The final result becomes an almost perfect clinical case. It
shows what must invariably happen when a procedure is regulated entirely by inB.exible statute, and when attempt is made to hold the judicial
duty to the highest peak of perfection without compelling counsel to
accept equal responsibility for perfection and completeness of the
charge.

South Carolina
South Carolina mechanics are very close to those heretofore described as to Alabama. Here, however, "the chief danger is the inadvertent omission of some important element of the charge" on the
218 State v. Boyle, 104 N.C. 800 at 820, IO S.E. 696 (1889), collecting the cases
from which this doctrine developed. But see State v. Anderson, 228 N.C. 720, 47 S.E.
(2d) 1 (1948).
210 State v. Smith, 237 N.C. 1, 74 S.E. (2d) 291 (1953).
220 Carruthers v. Atlantic & Yadkin Ry. Co., 215 N.C. 675, 2 S.E. (2d) 878 (1939);
Wilson v. Branning Mfg. Co., 120 N.C. 94, 26 S.E. 629 (1897); Mcim-osH, NonTH
CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PnoCEDUIIB §580, p. 642, esp. n. 60 (1929). See "A Survey of
Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1949," 27 N.C.L. REv. 405 at 435 (1949).
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judge's part.221 Under the bare meaning of the rule, a request which
is not entirely correct may be refused outright, but the better (and
doubtless the safer) practice on the judge's part is to work them into
the general charge after eliminating the incorrectness.222
There is a provision of the state constitution to the effect that the
trial judge "shall declare the law,"223 but that so-called constitutional
duty to charge has recently been restated as simply standing for the
very familiar principle
". . . that the judge shall state the contr9lling principles of law
applicable to the case in the light of the pleadings and the evidence, even if no request is presented by counsel for either party;
but that if any elaboration thereof, or a charge on some specific
phase, is desired, counsel must bring the matter to the attention of
the Court or it will be deemed to have been waived." 224
The requirement of specific objections does not prevail-it is believed to place a "delicate and difficult task" upon counsel in many
cases. The Supreme Court actually held in 1932 that "to make such
requirement might place counsel in an embarrassing position."225 On
the other hand, counsel cannot escape all responsibility-he must call
attention to error in the statement of the issues at the time, for
instance.226
No one can read The Trial Judge in South Carolina, by the late
Judge Lide, without being highly impressed with the judicial tradition
of this state. He will, incidentally, be rewarded with a great deal of
information as to the matter at hand as well as some whimsical byproducts. For instance, Judge Lide did not like to use standardized
instructions, saying "[they] may indeed be quite helpful, but like all
'canned products' they necessarily lack freshness."
Putting together the attitude toward objections (leniency), the
complete restriction of the judge (muzzled watchdog),227 the inflexible
221LmE, THB TRIAL JtmGE IN SoUTH CAROLINA 22 (1953); Youngblood v. So. R.
Co., 152 S.C. 265, 149 S.E. 742 (1929). See Coleman v. Lurey, 199 S.C. 442, 20 S.E.
(2d) 65 (1942).
222 LmE, THB TRIAL JUDGE IN SoUTH CAROLINA 63 (1953); note 224 infra.
223 CoNsT. oF 1895, art. 5, §26; 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 159 (1953).
224 Coleman v. Lurey, 199 S.C. 442 at 446, 20 S.E. (2d) 65 (1942); White v.
Charleston R. Co., 132 S.C. 448, 129 S.E. 457 (1925); Langley v. Southern R. Co., 113
S.C. 45, 101 S.E. 286 (1919).
22 5 Steinberg v. South Carolina Power Co., 165 S.C. 367 at 371, 163 S.E. 881 (1932).
226 Coleman v. Lurey, 199 S.C. 442 at 446, 20 S.E. (2d) 65 (1942); State v. Adams,
68 S.C. 421 at 427, 47 S.E. 676 (1904).
227 The term is quoted in a veteran S.C. practitioner's letter set out in MoRGAN, THB
LAw OF EVIDENCE: SoME PROPOSALS 13 (1927). See Figg, "Limitations on Trial Judge's
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statutory procedure, the fact that no conference for presettlement of
instructions is provided for, that the judge may have to try to digest as
much as 19 pages of closely typewritten requests while trying to preside
at trial,228 and the present 12-month docket delay in one county, one
finds a situation that is at least borderline. Were the charge not truly
oral, or were the South Carolina judicial traditions less proud, the ruling
on the map would certainly be dark instead of light.

Maryland
Maryland's reform in 1941 from one of the worst systems of instructing into one of the best is described at some length elsewhere.229
One might wonder if this new system is working well, in view of the
docket delay of ten months in Baltimore. The reports show that instructions are not causing undue trouble,230 however, whereas the reorganization of the courts in Maryland, long overdue, may-it is hoped
-correct the metropolitan court problem there. 231

As to the adequacy-of-charge problem in these five states, the extremes range from the Virginias-which ask little of the judge-to
North Carolina, which asks of him the impossible. In South Carolina
one saw a fine old common law system which had been mutilated by
constitutional changes and legislation of the difficult Reconstruction
days. Maryland has worked out a satisfactory escape from its ancient
system of written prayers ( which were simply handed to the jury after
a silent reading), and has something quite functional in its stead. It
may be of some significance that Maryland is the fastest-growing state
Co=enting on the Evidence in South Carolina Jury Trials," 5 S.C. L.Q. 214 (1952);
Soper, "The Charge to the Jury," 24 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 111 (1940).
228 Powers v. Rawls, 119 S.C. 134, 112 S.E. 78 (1922); LIDE, THE TRIAL JUDGE IN
SoUTH CAROLINA 61-63 (1953). S.C. Laws (1952), vol. 7, Circuit Court Rules: Rule 11
[as amended] re requests to charge. See new provision as to requests and objections to charge,
Acts of Gen. Assembly of S.C. (1953), no. 27, approved Feb. 20, 1953; 27 TEMPLE L.Q.
160 (1953).
229 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 148-151 (1953); 1954 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 202.
230West v. Belle Isle Cab Co., 203 Md. 244, 100 A. (2d) 17 (1953), collecting the
most frequently cited cases under the General Rules of Practice and Procedure, part 3, subd.
3, rule 6; Sun Cab Co. v. Powell, 196 Md. 572, 77 A. (2d) 783 (1951). And see Washington Suburban Sanitary Commn. v. Musgrove, 203 Md. 231, 100 A. (2d) 27 (1953).
231 Soper, "Reorganization of the Court of Appeal of Maryland," 8 Mn. L. REv. 91
(1944); editorial, "The Need for Further Procedural Reform in Maryland, Particularly
in the Criminal Procedure," 9 Mn. L. REv. 173 (1948); editorial: "Criminal Procedure
Reform Achieved in Maryland," 11 Mn. L. REv. 319 (1950); Elliott, "Judicial Administration-1953," 156, reprinted from 1953 AmmAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAw; Institute
of Judicial Administration, Check-List Summary of 1954 Developments in Judicial Administration, 4, 11, 12, 13, 17.
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in the circuit group-in line with the tentative theory herein being
tested that the federal rules system is an answer to the requirements of
an expanding economy or a growing population.

THIRD, SECOND, AND FmsT CmcuIT STATES
Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey; New York, Connecticut,
Vermont; Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Maine,
New Hampshire
The ten old-line states in these three circuits comprise the most
densely populated areas so far considered, and docket congestion is the
rule. Only in Delaware, Maine, New Jersey, and Vermont is the logjam in the courts not to be found. Another relative exception is Pennsylvania, which reports court congestion only in Pittsburgh. The disability and death of certain judges are believed related to that particular
problem of a 21-month backlog. Nevertheless Philadelphia County
Common Pleas are at a danger point of 9.5 months.
The average growth of 11 percent is not a very enlightening :figure,
since the real problem is the further crowding of the already overcrowded urban centers, and court delays of three to over four years in
and around Boston and New York.
Apart from New York, the codes have had little to do with procedure in this area. Maine and Massachusetts have statutes relating to
instructions, but even those have had little influence. The constitution
of Delaware forbids comment on the evidence, however, and Delaware
is here taken as the only state in which such restriction has any importance for present purposes. It will be seen that regulation of procedure
by judicial rule-making has been a favorable factor as to the instructing
process in Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and in Connecticut.
The court customarily summarizes the evidence in all states except
Delaware, although such review is minimal in New York. Oral instructions are the rule, being mandatory everywhere except Vermont-and
it is customary even there. Instructions follow closing arguments of
counsel in all these states.
Requests to charge are to be submitted prior to argument in all but
New York and Rhode Island, except that in Maine the court may :6x
the time for submission at its discretion.
As to adequacy of the charge, the foregoing description of mechanics shows that a general, oral charge is contemplated in every one of
these states. For that matter, the writer has found no instance of a
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complete failure to charge the jury in the reports of any of these states.

As to the judicial duty to charge, nine of these states ostensibly place
upon the court the duty of instructing the jury as to the law applicable
to the major issues of the case, whereas in New Jersey the cases say
that (apart from the rules of fundamental error) the court is required
to instruct only as to those matters on which correct instructions have
been submitted. The seeming uncompromising difference in these
positions will be seen to make no sharp difference as to adequacy of the
charge in this group, however, when the states have been considered
separately. Of particular interest are the experiences of the states in
working out their rules. Discussion will show that there is little likelihood of a jury being forced to bring in a crackerbarrel verdict in any of
these states. On the other hand, the extreme nicety of balance required
to make any general rule work in this connection will become even more
apparent. For the time being, the order of discussion of states will
follow the plan heretofore followed, whereby they are taken up in
inverse numerical order of the federal circuits.

Delaware
Delaware had permitted a practice to develop, "admittedly in the
teeth of common law tradition, whereby a general objection to the
charge sufficed to preserve many grounds of error with respect thereto."
A 1942 opinion of the Superior Court of Delaware contains a full and
interesting discussion of the course of this divergence from the English
practice. 232 This matter is now somewhat moot, however, since Delaware more recently has adopted superior court rules in which federal
rule 51 appears without modification.233 While the rule has not yet
received interpretation, it means-if it means anything-that objections
must be timely and specific.

Pennsylvania
The Pennsylvania reports mention fundamental error (as to
charges) with a surprising frequency. 234 Such cases may be seen in a
232 Buckley v. Johnson & Co., 41 Del. 546 at 558, 25 A. (2d) 392 (1942), quoting
Chitty's language, note 200 supra.
233 Del. Code Ann., Rules of the Superior Court (civil), rule 51, p. 411 (adopted
July 1, 1947); 1954 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 194.
234 See especially cases under Sears v. Birbeck, 321 Pa. 375, 184 A. 6 (1936), such
as Hodgson v. Bigelow, 335 Pa. 497, 7 A. (2d) 338 (1939); Kins v. Deere, 359 Pa. 106,
58 A. (2d) 335 (1948); Knight v. Allegheny County, 371 Pa. 484, 92 A. (2d) 225 (1952).
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very recent law review note which collects and discusses the cases of
the past century on this point in the light of adequacy of the charge.23 cs
It will be seen there that Pennsylvania adheres to the doctrine that a
high standard of adequacy of the charge must be maintained, and at
the same time has for more than a century adhered to the rules as to
objections which federal rule 51 codi:6.es.236 The cases might be taken
to mean, however, that in order to maintain the necessary balance, the
possibility of fundamental error of omission must be kept before the
judicial conscience. The memory of that duty, so to speak, is kept fresh
by noticing the possibility of fundamental error in connection with
appeals on instructions, although reversals on such a basis are infrequent.

New Jersey
In New Jersey, by contrast, it appears that "shocking error" is required before there will be a retrial for inadequacy of instructions.237
Anywhere else, such standard might afford little protection. It must be
remembered, however, that the New Jersey courts are truly administered.238 Judicial statistics are kept, and the product of the courts is
subject to strict internal control not only as to its quantity, but also as
to its quality. This is one of the few judicial enterprises that keep
books, despite the rather widespread opinion in other businesses and
professions that such recording and control are indispensable. On the
other side, that of counsel, it must be remembered that they are truly
officers of the court in this jurisdiction, and subject to its control. They
are in literal fact required to prosecute their cases with due diligence. 239
235 Note, 28 TEMPLE L.Q. 102 (1954).
236 Heil v. Glanding, 42 Pa. 493 at 499 (1862).

See Burkholder v. Stahl, 58 Pa. 371
at 377 (1869); 6 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA Pru.encl! §§3, 9, 22.
237 Melone v. New Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 30 N.J. Super. 95 at 105, 103
A. (2d) 615 (1954). "Nor is there plain error of a shocking sort of which we should take
notice under R.R. l:5-3(c)," State v. Picciotti, 12 N.J. 205, 96 A. (2d) 406 (1953). See
State v. Vaszorich, 13 N.J. 99, 98 A. (2d) 299 (1953).
238 The term "administered" is here used to indicate the unification and organization
of courts as recommended by the minimum standards. VANDl!RBILT, MrnxMuM STANDARDS
011 JUDICIAL Ai>MINisTRATION, c. 2, p. 29 (1949). See also PmsIG, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON JUDICIAL Ai>MINISTRATION, c. 5, p. 429 (1946). N.J. CONST. 01' 1947, AP..T. VI, §2,

,r3.

2 39 R.R. 1 :25 (Canons of Ethics) consists of an incoxporation of the 47 Canons of
Professonal Ethics of the American Bar Association. Canon 21 relates to punctuality and
expedition. Discipline of attorneys for failure to prosecute causes with due diligence has
occasionally been necessary. See Stoffer, "The Work of the Judicial System: 1953-54," 9
RUTGERS L. Rllv. 1 at 16 (1954). [note: N.J. rules are cited, pursuant to rule 1:1-10 as
''R.R." followed by the rule number (simpliciter), T:m! RllvxsION 011 THE RuLl!s Govl!RNING THE CouRTS OF THE STATE 01' NEw JERSEY (1953)].
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The rules by which this judicial administration is conducted are not
considered to be the Twelve Tables, but are looked upon as flexible
devices to facilitate the prompt and efficient disposition of cases. Thus,
were the bookkeeping of these courts to reveal evidence of frequent
complaint as to adequacy of charges, prompt correction of the weakness
in the system could and would doubtless be made.
The avowed New Jersey goal is to eliminate appeals not on the
merits, and to avoid disturbance of a jury verdict except in the most
extreme case. 240 Although there is no unanimity as to reports on the
exact degree of achievement, it is conceded on the one hand that "the
hallmark of the new practice is its devotion to the merits," and on the
other that many "reported decisions are still concerned, to one degree or
another, with points of practice."241

New York
In New York the ancient tradition of oral requests to charge,
proffered after argument, still persists. As to a dragnet objection, however, only the· most flagrant unfairness could conceivably be reached
thereby. 242 It is to be noted that the Civil Practice Act seemingly permits objections or exceptions to be taken at any time before verdict is
rendered.243 As suggested earlier, incidentally, the judicial custom is
to confine the summary to a recital of the merest skeleton of the facts.
It further seems that the power to comment on the facts is rarely exercised. 244 The fact remains, however, that it is admitted that the New
York trial judge has ample power to control his courtroom245-a power
240 Rule 1:5-1 (criminal); rule 1:5-3 (civil). Rapp v. Public Service Coordinated
Transport, 9 N.J. 11, 86 A. (2d) 676 (1952); Stevens v. Roettger, 22 N.J. Super. 64, 91
A. (2d) 617 (1952); Clapp, "Civil Procedure in State Courts," 1951 AmruAL SURVEY
OF AMERICAN LAw 799, 807.
241 Schnitzer, "Civil Practice and Procedure," 9 RUTGERS L. RBv. 307 at 340 (1954).
242 Brozek v. Steinway R. Co., 161 N.Y. 63, 55 N.E. 395 (1899); Walsh v. Kelly,
40 N.Y. 556 (1869); 4 WA:IT's NEw Yonx: PBACTICB, 4th ed., 322 (1938); 4 CARMoDYS
NEW Yonx: PBACTICB, 2d ed., 3085 (1932).
243 New York Civil Practice (Cahill-Parsons, 1946) §446; Altman v. Central New
York Bldg. Corp., 106 N.Y.S. (2d) 695 at 698 (1951) for discussion and collection of
authorities at syll. 3, 4, p. 698.
244 Diamond, "Instructions to Jury," in 2 TRIAL PRACTICE 8 (Practicing Law Institute pamphlet) (1946); editorial, "Judges in New York May Advise Juries," 17 J. AM..
JUD. Soc. 187 (1934), being a report of colorful remarks of the late Justice Dowling
before the N.Y. State Bar Assn. See note, 2 BROOKLYN L. RBv. 273 (1933).
245 Nims, "Comments on the Minimum Standards of the A.B.A. as Applied to the
Courts of New York," 25 N.Y. UNIV. L. RBv. 701 at 714 (1950); Hurlbut v. Hurlbut,
128 N.Y. 420 at 426, 28 N.E. 651 (1891); Hoffman v. N.Y. Central R. Co., 87 N.Y. 25
(1881).
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which seldom exists unless he has the freedom which results from
possession of the power to charge orally, and to discuss the facts.
In view <;>f the overwhelming problems of court organization facing
the metropolitan New York courts, and which are now under study,
it seems picayune to suggest that the federal rules method as to requests
and objections might improve what is a basically and fundamentally
sound system for charging the jury.

Rhode Island
The foregoing description of the New York system is in general
applicable to that of Rhode Island, as well. Yet comparison of those
states may seem incongruous. It must be remembered, however, that
the density of population of Rhode Island is the highest in the country,
and that it has a metropolitan court problem at Providence. Caveat
should be made that the New York remarks as to disuse of the comment power do not apply to Rhode Island. In this small state the judges
often speak freely. 246
It will be noticed that there has been a departure from the order
(inverse) of circuits here--a change which is made to enable showing
certain similarities and contrasts. Massachusetts will be discussed next,
then Connecticut, followed by Vermont and Maine. Discussion of
New Hampshire will complete the circuit(s) of the 48 states.

Massachusetts
Massachusetts has entirely too many appeals on instructions in its
reports, yet it cannot be said that its system does not tend toward
adequacy. The duty of the court is generally taken to be high. 247 As
a leading case points out, the "duty to give instructions covering the
main factual hypotheses of the case is an absolute duty which must be
performed irrespective of requests...." 248
When viewed from the other side, that of counsel's responsibility,
the matter appears thus: "... the field where requests for instruction
246Flint v. Nicholson, 67 R.I. 513, 25 A. (2d) 617 (1942); 1954 WASH. Umv. L.Q.
205 at 206.
247 Judicial responsibility: Brick v. Bosworth, 162 Mass. 334 at 337, 39 N.E. 36
(1894). Orality and continuity: Herrick v. Waitt, 224 Mass. 415, 113 N.E. 205 (1916);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Jackson, 230 Mass. 384, 119 N.E. 682 (1918); McMahon v.
O'Connor, 137 Mass. 216 (1884); Howes v. Grush, 131 Mass. 207 (1881); Counsel must
pinpoint objections: Jones v. Newton St. Ry. Co., 186 Mass. 113, 71 N.E. 114 (1904);
Boutelle v. Dean, 148 Mass. 89, 18 N.E. 681 (1888).
248 Brick v. Bosworth, 162 Mass. 334 at 337, 39 N.E. 36 (1894).
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are necessary and proper is rather narrow, since there is no necessity
for requests on the main points in a case and there is no right to requests
which narrow out a portion of the facts or evidence."249
Perhaps the best way to evaluate such a system is to turn back to
the Second Circuit for a moment, and consider the case history to be
seen in Connecticut.
Connecticut

"The English reform greatly influenced the Connecticut Code of
1879, one of the more successful of the early American codes...." 250
The function of the Connecticut trial judge, until well after 1900, at
least, seems however to have been taken from English tradition rather
than legislation.251 "It is not for the attorneys to frame the charge,"
said Connecticut cases on appeal. 252 "No Help Wanted," in effect was
what the court of errors and appeals was saying; "he can handle that
job all by himself."
To that extent, and perhaps to that extent only, it appears that the
transplant did not "take." One sees that in about 1929 the appellate
rule-making power was reinforced. In a significantly short time thereafter an old rule was reactivated ( which rule has since been amended
to button itself up even tighter) to the effect that the supreme court of
errors shall not be bound to consider errors of omission or commission
in the absence of request or specific objection made in good time. 253
It became apparent that such rule had long been needed, since the
basic position of the cases theretofore had been that the "parties in every
action have the right to expect that the court will direct the jury concerning every question of law arising in the trial of each case ... [and]
omission [of any essential matter] will be error."254
2 49

Morn.A, MAssACHOsEns PRACTICE-CIVIL §426, p. 229 (1948). See Superior

Court Rules Ann. (1932) pp. 199-200.
250 Cr.ARK, ConE PLEADING, 2d ed., 20, esp. n. 43 (1947).
25l "Counsel are not expected to even intimate to the [English]

judge how they would
like to have the jury charged." Sunderland, "Modern English Legal Practice," 4 T:sx. L
REv. 273 at 288 (1925-6). As to the tradition, see Lex, "The Late Mr. Baron Huddleston,"
5 GREEN BAc 105 at 106 (1893).
2 52 State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18 at 30, 46 A. 409 (1900). See Hartford v. Champion,
58 Conn. 268 at 276, 20 A. 471 (1889).
.
2 153 Rules for the Trial Court, §153, Tim CoNNECTICllT PRACTICE BooK OP 1951.
Note: the same section appeared as §156 in the 1934 PRACTICE BooK; its present form
incorporates revisions and amendments of 1943 and 1951. As to history: Maltbie, "The
Rule-Making Power of the Judges," Tim CoNNECTICllT PRACTICE BooK oP 1951, xi-xvii.
254 Pietrycka v. Simolan, 98 Conn. 490 at 499, 120 A. 310 (1923); Lindquist v.
Maril<le, 99 Conn. 233 at 236, 121 A. 474 (1923); Hartford v. Champion, 58 Conn. 268,
20 A. 471 (1889).
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The scores of cases that followed enforcement of the new appellate
rule show quite clearly that counsel very frequently failed to submit
any requests whatsoever. 255 From the cases examined-and which may
be found in almost every column of the Connecticut reports from 1929
until rather recent years-it is clear that reeducation has not been
instantaneous.256 It has been necessary to condition the bar to a reciprocal responsibility for completeness of the charge, and it appears that
the process is not complete.
Finally, it must be noticed that the appellate court's rule does not
say that it will not review-it simply says that it need not. The cases
show that it sometimes invokes the rule, and does not notice allegations
of errors of omission.257 At other and proper times, it considers matters
of fundamental omissions or errors, just as do the United States courts
of appeals despite the strict requirements of federal rule 51.258
Vermont and Maine

A good collection of Vermont cases may be found in the original
version of Hogan's "The Strangled Judge."259 That article incidentally depicts, in a closed and nonmetropolitan milieu, a relationship
between bench and bar which many city lawyers might envy. As to
Maine, certain aspects of the charge there were suggested in an earlier
article. 26 ° For the present question of adequacy, however, it is believed
that New Hampshire will best illustrate the reciprocity principles
255 "A large portion of all the decisions of the Supreme Court deal with the correctness and adequacy of charges to the jury in particular cases...." MALTBIE, CoNNECI'ICUT
.APPELLATE PROCEDURE §46, p. 65 (1940). See annotations to §153, THE CoNNECI'ICUT
PnACI'IcE BooK OF 1951, pp. 80, 81; CoNNEcncUT DIGEST §42 (1945). There is no
abundance of cases on "comment," however, as the judicial power in that respect is confirmed by statute: Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949 rev.) §§7969, 8806.
256 E.g., Bjorkman v. Newington, 113 Conn. 181, 154 A. 346 (1931); Ursini v.
Goldman, 118 Conn. 554, 173 A. 789 (1934); Iannucci v. Lamb, 123 Conn. 142, 193 A.
212 (1937).
257Tully v. Demir, 131 Conn. 330 at 334, 39 A. (2d) 877 (1944); Greenwald v.
Wire Rope Corp. of America, 131 Conn. 465 at 470, 40 A. (2d) 748 (1944); Cervino v.
Coratti, 131 Conn. 518 at 522, 41 A. (2d) 95 (1945); Ladd v. Burdge, 132 Conn. 296
at 297, 43 A. (2d) 752 (1945); Kiss v. Kahm, 132 Conn. 593 at 594, 46 A. (2d) 337
(1946); Ehrhard v. Taylor, 136 Conn. 13 at 14, 68 A. (2d) 133 (1949); Bradley v.
Nieman, 137 Conn. 81 at 83, 74 A. (2d) 876 (1950); Automotive Twins, Inc. v. Klein,
138 Conn. 28 at 35, 82 A. (2d) 146 (1951).
258 Kucineski v. Davey, 123 Conn. 662 at 665, 197 A. 688 (1938); Riley v. Connecticut Co., 129 Conn. 554 at 557, 29 A. (2d) 759 (1943); Mickel v. New England
Coal & Coke Co., 132 Conn. 671 at 674, 47 A. (2d) 187 (1946); Proto v. Bridgeport
Herald Corp., 136 Conn. 557, 72 A. (2d) 820 (1950).
259 22 VT. ST. B. AssN. 13-63 (1929).
260 Maine: 1954 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 204-205. Vermont: id. at 178, esp. n. 8.
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which are at the base of any system making for adequacy of the charge.
It can safely be said, furthermore, that in all three states a duty to see
that the jury does not go out uninstructed is recognized. 261 Maine,
however, makes it clear that "the court is under no legal obligation to
perform any part of the duty of counsel."262

New Hampshire
New Hampshire has what has heretofore been called the sufficientto-suggest rule, and which has been mentioned in connection with
Washington, Kentucky, Ohio, and federal cases.263 Whereas in Kentucky the principle was applied against a low basic-duty background,
here it has somewhat different surroundings.264 Here, in addition to
the basic duties of the court as to fundamental issues and principles of
law, it is possible for circumstances and an incomplete, incorrect, or
untimely request ( which may come in the form of an exception) to put
the court on notice as to the necessity of instructions on a matter going
somewhat beyond the bare essentials.265
Generally, the reciprocal duties of court and counsel in New Hampshire can hardly be separated. An illustration is given in the rather
well known case of Perlman v. Haigh. 266 There the supreme court
remanded for new trial, after judgment on a verdict for defendant,
because there had been no charge on the sudden emergency doctrine.
At the conclusion of the charge, plaintiff's counsel had said: "I except
to the court's refusal to make a statement relative to the sudden emergency doctrine." The court replied that there had been no request for
261 Vermont: Rowell v. Town of Vershire, 62 Vt. 405 at 408, 19 A. 990 (1890); In
re Bean's Will, 85 Vt. 452, 82 A. 734 (1912); Merrihew's Admr. v. Goodspeed, 102 Vt.
206, 147 A. 346 (1929). See also Luce v. Hassam, 76 Vt. 450, 58 A. 725 (1904).
262Virgie v. Stetson, 73 Me. 452 (1882). See State v. Benner, 64 Me. 267 at 291
(1874), for interpretation of the instructions statute of 1874 [Me. Rev. Stat. (1954) c.
100, §104]. But the court "should make the position and contention of the litigants
clear.•••" Benner v. Benner, 120 Me. 468, ll5 A. 202 (1921); Desmond v. Wilson,
143 Me. 262, 60 A. (2d) 782 (1948).
263 Kennett v. Yates, 41 Wash. (2d) 558, 250 P. (2d) 962 (1952), and Montgomery
v. Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., (D.C. Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 770; Louisville & N.R. Co.
v. Craft, 192 Ky. 314, 233 S.W. 741 (1921); Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. De Atley, 241
U.S. 310, 36 S.Ct. 64 (1916); note, 22 CoL. L. REv. 162 (1922).
264Kentucky: Jones v. Saunders, 284 Ky. 571, 145 S.W. (2d) 514 (1940); STANLEY,
!NsTRucnoNs To Jtrnms IN KENTUCKY (1948 Supp.) §13. New Hampshire: Burke v.
B. & M. R. Co., 82 N.H. 350, 134 A. 574 (1926); Bjork v. U.S. Bobbin & Shuttle Co.,
79 N.H. 402, Ill A. 284 (1920).
265 Perlman v. Haigh, 90 N.H. 405, IO A. (2d) 228 (1939). Generally, however,
"An exception to an instruction is unavailing unless the attention of the court is specifically
directed to the error claimed." Bixby v. B. & M. R., 94 N.H. 107, 47 A. (2d) 922 (1946).
266 90 N.H. 404, IO A. (2d) 228 (1939).
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such and added, "... the Court has not had an opportunity to consider
it, whether or not it should be applied, in view of the request coming
at this time," and made no charge thereon. 267
The supreme court reminded the trial court that the duty to charge
in the first instance rests upon the court, that counsel also has a duty.
It recognized that counsel in fact had made no request in writing, nor
had he complied with the court rule as to time of submission, but he
had succeeded in putting the court upon notice as to an essential element of his case, adding:
"In view of the rule which prevails in this jurisdiction as to
the reciprocal duties of court and counsel, plaintiff's counsel was
justified in assuming that this phase of the case would be covered
by the charge even though no specific request were made iii writ•
mg
...."268

In summarizing this group of ten states, it is hard to see how any
rule could be more logical than that last mentioned. Yet in a metropolitan setting its general administration would be a matter of extreme
difficulty. The basic principle of reciprocity and the right to rely is
fundamental justice. It lies at the very opposite extreme of the rule
that has been applied in several of the Fifth Circuit states. That opposite rule permits refusal of a request if it contains even so much as an
obvious typographical error.269 The application of the present rule, in
the form seen in Perlman v. Haigh, 210 however, presupposes a small
bar which generally practices with and before courts and counsel whose
habits and even eccentricities are so well known as to make their next
moves to some extent predictable. It is hardly a workable rule for the
metropolitan practice in which court and counsel are strangers more
often than not.
The application of the foregoing remarks to the practice in these
three circuits will be clarified after a brief reference to the federal rules.
It is within the states of these circuits that one can often call forth an
argument as to whether the federal rules follow the state practice, or
the state practice conforms to the federal. A short answer is that the
267 Id.
268 Id.

at 404.
at 405. See also Ware v. B. & M. R. Co., 93 N.H. 213 at 214, 38 A. (2d) 879
(1944): ''But the duty of Court and counsel are reciprocal in this respect."
269 "Charge 13, requested by the defendant, has evidently typographical errors, which
alone would justify its refusal .•••" Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Garth, 192 Ala. 91 at 95,
68 S. 871 (1915); Ala. Code (1940), tit. 7, §273; Thomas v. State, 124 Ala. 48 at 57, 27
S. 315 (1900); Jarrell v. State, 35 Ala. App. 256 at 262, 50 S. (2d) 767 (1949).
210 90 N.H. 404, IO A. (2d) 228 (1939).
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federal rules are based on such of the common law practice as is adapted
to prompt adjudication of modern day litigation (in courts which now,
for the most part, are very busy indeed). It is in the details of rule 51time and form of requests; advance notice of proposed action by the
court; time and manner of objections-that the adaptation to modem
pressure is especially to be seen.
Within this Atlantic group one need not go to the small New England states to find practice situations which do not require every modern
facility to permit the local court to keep pace with the pressure of time.
Pennsylvania and New York have their agricultural areas wherein conditions of practice resemble those of rural Vermont and New Hampshire. It is undeniable, however, that state practice cannot be tailored
county by county; it must strike a median that meets the needs of the
greatest bulk of the population. If any fault can be found with the
details of the safeguards for adequacy in these states it might be as
follows. The general system throughout the region is the same, yet
the requirements of the area range from one extreme to the other. It
might well be that the systems of Massachusetts and New York could
be implemented further with some of the mechanical facilities of the
federal rules, especially as to the time and form of requests for instructions. It is, for that matter, believed that such result is achieved to a
considerable extent by local rules of court. The difficulty of such
method is, however, that local rules tend to make for complexity and
obscurity of practice.

Recapitulation
"I would advise you to set aside your therapeutic ambitions and try
to understand what is happening," said one of the most controversial
figures in medicine. 'When you have done that, therapeutics will take
care of itself."271 That very statement is controversial in the present
context, but perhaps not entirely inapt, as a review of "what is happening" may show. As to that review, one may look first at the bright side
of the map-picture.
In the Tenth Circuit were seen the youngest, most sparsely populated states. There the fastest growing members are asking more of
trial procedure than that which satisfied their pioneer predecessors, and
the majority of that group have adopted part or all of the federal rules.
271Attn"buted to Sigmund Freud hy Weinberg in ''Mechanism and Neurosis," 39
.AMmlxCAN ScmNTIST 74 (1951).
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Noticeable is the setback caused by an abortive effort to anticipate
change in Colorado in 1930. It is even possible that lag in improvement of instructing processes of several neighboring states is not unrelated thereto.
In the seven states in the Ninth Circuit group, pressure of rapid
growth was seen to have caused adaptation toward the minimum standards and federal rule 51 in California, Arizona and Nevada, while
straws in the winds of Oregon and Washington were also noticed.
In the twenty states next considered, being the states in circuits 8,
7, 6 and 5, older groups of settlements were seen. These constituted
the remainder of the states with the exception of the Old Colonies of
the eastern seaboard. Of these intermediate states, Minnesota and
Michigan were seen to stand out in the extent of their compliance with
the rules here taken as making for the more adequate charge.
In the faint-ruled or reasonably adapted group appear South Dakota, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas and Louisiana, and
finally, Florida. The Louisiana system is included in this group of
eight simply because, under its particular system of law, it at least
avoids retrials not on the merits. There was nothing in its system referable to common law procedure, however, except a certain faint resemblance to features to be found in the statutory special verdict.
Tennessee, like Louisiana, is not a state where there has been any
noticeable change or progress in the instructing procedure. It is simply
a jurisdiction that has provided as workable a system as possible within
its constitutional restriction on the judge. Apart from the states retaining the common law freedom of the judge, the Tennessee practice has
more of the features of the English method of charge than may be found
except on the Atlantic seaboard.
The other states are South Dakota, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, Texas
and Florida. Of these, all but South Dakota and Iowa have adopted
rules modelled very closely after federal rule 51. The inB.uence of that
same rule is very noticeable in Iowa, and South Dakota has secured a
number of its features. In each one of these, against a background of
considerable restriction in a number of respects, a better solution is thus
reached. In every one of those instances, the discussion has shown
that the responsibilities of court and counsel are placed in better balance. Everywhere except Kentucky, where the rule is too recent to
have had interpretation, the cases show the new rules to be functioning.
Remands for retrial, resulting from inadequacy of the charge, are markedly abating in these states.
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In the Fourth Circuit, the system of South Carolina is believed to
work well. It seems, however, from the writer's Yankee viewpoint, that
leniency as to objections is a little overdone-and the same might be
said as to Florida mentioned earlier. In the same circuit, Maryland
made a remarkable change via the federal rules model and got away
from one of the most ineffective procedures imaginable in the process.
The states in the first three circuits, ranging from Delaware to
Maine, all retain the American common law system with sufficient
integrity to avoid much likelihood of inadequacy of the charge.272 The
newcomer to this group is Delaware, under its recent adoption of the
federal rules.
It is to be noticed that of twenty-nine states shown on the map as
being white or faint-ruled, at least sixteen may be said to have made
or taken some definite step toward improvement in the past twenty-£ve
years: Utah and New Mexico; Arizona, California and Nevada; Iowa,
Minnesota and South Dakota; Indiana; Michigan and Kentucky; Texas
and Florida; Maryland; Delaware; and Connecticut. Minor changes
in systems already workable, such as that to be seen in South Carolina,
are not included in the foregoing tabulation of sixteen.
The so-called trouble spots on the map, being the states shown in
black, are Oklahoma; Nebraska and Missouri; Illinois; Mississippi and
Georgia; and :finally North Carolina (being listed in inverse order of
circuits in the fashion followed throughout).
The reasons for such listings, briefly recapitulated, are, in order:
Nebraska and Oklahoma set the duty of the court to charge sua sponte
at a very high level, and counsel is given maximum freedom from
responsibility. In Missouri and Illinois the court has no responsibility
of its own motion to give an adequate charge-the matter being left
to counsel; in Mississippi the court does not even have power to instruct
of its own motion. Adequacy of the charge depends entirely, in Mississippi at least, upon whether the counsel will happen to cover the
case in their combined requests. The remaining two states have high
duty of the court, low duty of counsel. North Carolina has the additional duty to state the contentions of the parties and summarize the
272 It is the writer's conviction that there is an American common law charge, being
close to that of the federal trial courts, found in about thirteen of the states. That such
charge is "as at common law" seems somewhat an afterthought-a fact first brought to light
in Vicksburg & Meridian Ry. Co. v. Putnam, ll8 U.S. 545, 7 S.Ct. 1 (1886), and underscored in Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 at 16, 19 S.Ct. 580 (1899). The discussion in 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 137-164 and 1954 Wash. UNIV. L.Q. 177-212 points to very
considerable differences between the American and the English common law charge.
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evidence without comment, all of its own motion. Especially in Georgia, and to some extent in North Carolina, the exact extent of the court's
duty seems to "depend"-but what it depends upon seems to be determined by the reviewing courts on a sort of freirechtsfindung or freewheeling basis.273 Stated otherwise, the standard of the reviewing
courts seems to be somewhat plastic.
Particularly in Oklahoma, Nebraska, Missouri, Illinois and Mississippi, the written instructions system is a fearful source of reversals for
error (of commission) in instructions.
The twelve states shown in the dark ruling are, respectively: Colorado, Kansas and Wyoming; Montana and Idaho; Arkansas and North
Dakota; Ohio; Alabama; and Virginia and West Virginia. The instructing practice in these states generally seems subject to too many
restrictions upon the court-whatever the attitude toward the court's
Duty to Charge may be. As seen, the latter may vary from laissez faire
to rather indecisive positions like that of Wyoming. Whatever the
particular combination may be, the result is always too many reversals
for instructions. Generally, these two middle views as to the sua sponte
duty-without-power are simply gradations between the extremes seen in
Mississippi at one end and Nebraska at the other. As Tweedledum
might have said: "It makes no difference which road you take-they
both end up at the same place." Here the "same place" is the treacherous system wherein on the one hand judgments have no finality and,
on the other, there is no assurance that the twelve forgotten men in
the box will be given any useful guidance.
CONCLUSION

It is somewhat consoling to recall that reform in procedure always
moves "by very short steps."274 It would, however, be no great task for
a cynic to point out that many of the steps which have been herein
recounted are much too short to assure adequacy of the charge. It might
thus be suggested that, as to a number of the light-ruled states, for
example, "disfigurements" still abound, and furthermore, that many of
273 See Radin, ''The Good Judge of CMteau-Thierry and His American Counterpart,"
10 CALIP. L. REv. 300 (1922); Introduction by John W. Salmon to Geny, "Freedom of
Decision," in ScmNCE AND Ll!GAL METHon-SBLl!CT EssAYS 41 (Modem Legal Philosophy
Series) (1917). The comparison is only partially apt; these courts follow precedent-but
now have a variety of precedent from which to choose.
274 For a valuable recital of the slow course of reform since the 18th century, see
McWilliams, ''The Law: A Dynamic Profession," 41 A.B.A.J. 18 (1955).
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the alleged "reforms" are simply waiver provisions--statutes of limitations in minuscule, so to speak. The skeptic could assert that the mere
tightening of requirements as to requests and specific objections are no
assurance that a court, given this new buckler, will not in its turn view
the instruction proceedings with the 6.ne "detachment" theretofore
enabled on the part of counsel.
Before attacking that strawman, it might be an act of courtesy to
indicate the scope of this necessarily brief conclusion. Its respective
topics could be labeled about as follows: Reform; Sanctions; Judges
and Judicial Selections; Research; Jurisprudence and Comparative
Law; Law and Facts (special verdicts); Human Elements (and
human nature); and Some Simple Fundamentals. Since those eight
subjects are inseparable for present purposes, or at least merge imperceptibly, it seems unwise to categorize the discussion by separate
headings.
Returning to the realist's (cynical or skeptical) challenge, it seems
not entirely unanswerable. One response is that the underlying and
basic duty-to-charge, on the part of the courts, is intrinsically much
higher than the previous discussion has been able to indicate. Such is
clearly and indisputably the fact as to criminal cases. True, the basic
duty seems on the civil side to have been minimized. Looking back
to some of the states seen in the Ninth and Eighth Circuits, for instance,
it seems likely that the lowering of the elemental duty took place as a
natural defensive compensation to indulgence of the general objection
and increased power of counsel. The latent duty to charge is believed
to be present at all times, however, although in some places the sole
apparent basis is the obligation of the judicial oath. An example in that
connection may be found in one of the severely restricted jurisdictions,
Illinois. Back in 1859 the supreme court, by Walker, J., said in response
to a challenge of the trial court's right to instruct sua sponte:
"Instead of its being error for the court on its own motion to
instruct, where it seems to be required by the justice of the case, it
is rather the duty of the judge to give such instructions. . . . And
we have no hesitation in saying that so far from its being error,
that the court acted in strict conformity with the duty imposed by
the oath of the judge, and the requirements of the law."275

It is perfectly true that the judicial duty in that particular state
has been beclouded by later opinions, but such change is entirely
275

Stumps v. Kelly, 22 ill. 140 at 142 (1859).
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consistent with the development of more and more refinements of what
are here called the indirect -restraints. By inevitable progression, the
initiating-duty of the trial court must be lowered as his power is
decreased-if a predicament like that seen in North Carolina is to be
avoided.
Mention of the judicial oath raises the political and personal element of the character of the judge himself. It is axiomatic that judicial
selection is an imperfect process in the majority of the states. Somewhat incidentally, however, the writer interpolates his personal wonderment at the fact that our trial judges are as good as they are generally. His only explanation, in the face of the execrable methods of
election of judges, is that the potency of the judicial oath (in its effect
upon those who undertake it) must be much greater than the lay public
believes it to be. Another possible explanation of why the trial judge
is so very frequently found to be so remarkably capable and conscientious is an unappraisable factor. It may be called anything from American luck to the political genius of the democratic system of government.
If it is luck, however, few will deny that we are "crowding our luck"
by continuance of prevalent methods of judicial selection and by failure to give the trial judiciary the security of proper tenure.
Reform as to judicial selection and tenure is of course needed, and
such is a "must" canon of the minimum standards of judicial administration. 276 Reform in the direction of the minimum standards is going
forward on a number of fronts, of course, but discussion thereof would
mean further departure from the topic at hand. It must therefore suffice to say here that better selection and tenure of and for the judiciary
seems an inescapable element for reconstruction in the present phases
of procedure. Nevertheless, it is not practicable to await improved
judicial selection before seeking to provide better machinery for that
"improved" judiciary to use.
Another phase of the duty to charge which stands in need of
closer consideration is a matter as to which the law schools of the
country can serve. Dean Pound has pointed toward the state law
schools and the need for their service as "ministries of justice."277
276 It is significant that "Judicial Selection, Conduct and Tenure" is the title of the
first chapter of VANDERBILT, Mmi:MUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (1949)
(bibliography therein). See almost any issue of the Journal of the American ]1u1.icature
Society, e.g., Brand: "Selection of Judges-The Fiction of Majority Election," 34 AM. JUD.
Soc. 136 (1951); Winters, "A Better Way to Select our Judges,'' id. at 166.
277 Pound, "A Ministry of Justice: A New Role for the Law School," 38 A.B.A.J.
637 (1952).
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By what may be more than a coincidence, many of the "national" law
schools are located in sections of the country where the worst problems
as to adequacy of instructions are not to be found. The law schools
elsewhere might well give more study and attention to the matter of
instructions-and here something considerably more ambitious than
collating standardized, "approved" instructions is contemplated.
Whatever else they may be, instructions are a matter of pressing
and practical concern to most lawyers (apart from certain specialists).
Surely such is the case in the states other than those on the north
Atlantic seacoast. Were the law schools to interest themselves in this
direction, a step would for one thing be taken toward conciliation of
that segment of the bar which finds the law school product utterly
untrained in the practical.278 To sense the force of this suggestion, one
should compare the columns of space devoted to problems of instruction in the states' bar association periodicals with the rarity of treatment
of the subject in the institutional law reviews.
From the law schools' standpoint, the subject of instructions need
not be confined to the rather bare phases of observation and crude comparison such as that to be found in the present article. So soon as the
literature of comparative state law as to procedure has been sufficiently
built up to permit one to know what the "is" is, a solid base for jurisprudential inquiries will be provided. Any attempt to get much beneath the surface in a 48-state study like the present one, however, is
largely futile in the face of the necessity for condensation.
The present matter of adequacy of the charge is a proolem far too
urgent and recurrent to be allowed to remain at the stage of mere
observation and comparative description. One may here suggest a few
more basic aspects of the problem-without trying to solve it-to show
that this "duty" should be run down to its jurisprudential roots. Where,
for instance, does this judicial duty ex sua motu fit into the AngloAmerican common law principle of party prosecution? It has until
now herein been assumed that there is such a duty. Perhaps to this
extent the writer has been following the admonition of Sir Frederick
Pollock, who urged that in our reexamination of our common law
heritage we assume an "excellent arrogance." 279 One might stop to
278 Cantrall, "Economic Inventory of the Legal Profession: Lawyers Can Take Lessons
from Doctors," 38 A.B.A.J. 196 at 199 (1952); HARNo, LEGAL EDucATlON IN THE UNinm
STATES 146-155 (1953).
270 PoLLOCK, TBE EXPANSION oi: THE CoMMoN LAw 9 (1904).
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ask, however, "Are you sure it is a duty?" Surely many American text, writers of the 19th century did not think so, as witnesses the statement
of Graham and Waterman's New Trials:
"The court may instruct the jury without being moved so to
do, but it is not bound to do it; and it need only decide upon the
instructions as asked, and is under no obligation to mould them
into proper form." 280
It is a truism that in the common law system the parties always are
the ones to bring their case into court. Going farther, under what is
called the transaction-maxim, the scope and content of the judicial
controversy is to be defined by the parties. 281 Conversely, the court is
restricted to a consideration of what the parties put before it.
That is not at all the way the English procedure appeared to the
Civilian, Tissier, writing in 1906 concerning projected reform of the
French Code of Procedure. By what seems to us an amazing turning
of the tables, he complains that whereas in England and Germany the
judge has always taken a strongly active hand in directing the cause
through the stages of trial, the French judge plays a purely passive
role. He argues that the code philosophy must be modified, as it has
been in the province of Quebec, in terms of greater activity of the
judge in the management of the trial. He observes significantly that
a case does not belong entirely to the parties-at least, it does not so
belong after it has been brought into court.282
Sometime, and it must have been a rather long time ago, the
common law decided that once the cause was before the judges, it no
longer was the exclusive property of the parties. That it was able to
do without any fundamental change in the judicial function, and without violating the fundamental that
"The essence of a judge's office is that he shall be impartial,
that he is to sit apart, is not to interfere voluntarily in affairs, is
not to act sua sponte, but is to determine cases which are presented
to him. To use the phrase of the English Ecclesiastical courts, the
office of the judge must be promoted by some one."283
2so Vol. 3 at 807 (1855); but see SAcKETI', INSTRUCTIONS AND REQUBSTS FOR INSTRUCTIONS §4 (''Duty of Court to Instruct") (1881).
281 Millar, "The Formative Principles of Civil Procedure," 18 ILL. L. REv. 1 at 9 ff.

(1923).
282 Tissier, ''Le Centenaire du Code de Procedure et les Projets de Refonne," 5
REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DnoIT CIVIL 625 at 647 (1906).
283GRAY, THE NATURE AND SouncEs OF THE LAw, 2d ed., 114 (1928). See quotation
and discussion in FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JumsPRUDENCE 318 (1949); and see FIELD
AND KAPLAN, MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 13, 101 (1953).
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Stated otherwise, if the foregoing principle ever stood for the notion
that the cause belonged to the parties after it had gone to trial, that time
must have been earlier than jury trial as we have known it for three
centuries. It must be much older than that, but we are uninterested in
trial as it existed before Bushell's case--the time in the year 1670 when
the independent jury emerged. 284 The common law of the 18th and
19th centuries was individualistic, but if it was ever individualistic to
the extent that the court did not take over the processing of the cause
once the jury was sworn, the common law is now like Pollock's old riHe
that has been fitted with a new stock, a new lock, and a new barrel.
It must be taken as given or postulated for present purposes that
there is a duty to perform the judicial function of instructing the jury
on fundamentals, and that such duty has already been "promoted" by
the "some one" who brought the cause before the court, by his very
act of submitting the case for trial by jury. It is very likely, however,
that the proposition stated by Graham and Waterman, and which is a
statement of the law as it is ostensibly enforced in several states today,
is an excess of the transaction-maxim or party-prosecution principle.
In other words, the principle was carried too far into the successive
stages of procedure. The motives leading to such distortion of the
maxim are doubtless to be found in the history of American politics,285
of the settlement of the West, 286 and to no small degree in the collective history of the American lawyer2 87 and of Legal Education in the
United States. 288
Whatever is the jurisprudential basis, the entire law of procedure
would have to be rewritten before one could deny that once a cause is
"in court," it is the judicial office to assume a certain supervision; the
machinery has been set in motion. As we were in the habit of saying
in our local bar, "Once the case is at issue, you are in the gears." As to
the administrative functions of the court, it is likely that some of the
newer supervisory functions have come in by way of equity procedure.
284Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670), discussed in Blume,
"Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict," 48 MrcH. L. REv. 555 (1950).
285 ScHLESINGER, THE AGE OF JACKSON, c. 25, p. 329 ff. (1946); Farley, "Instructions to Juries-Their Role in the Judicial Process," 42 YALE L.J. 194 at 199 ff. (1932).
286 PoOND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw 112 ff. (1921); PoOND, APPELLATE
PROCEDURE IN Civn. CAsEs 380 (1941); Pound, "The Judicial Office in America,'' IO
BosT. UNIV. L. REv. 125 at 135 (1930).
287 PoOND, THE LAWYER FROM A.NnQmTY To MoDERN TIMES 225-242 (1953).
288 HARNo, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 35-40 and 71-80 (1953)
(Survey of the Legal Profession).

844

MrcHIGAN LAW REvmw

[ Vol. 53

It is in any event certain that pretrial, discovery, the use of special
questions _in the court's discretion, and a great many more such facilities are now part_ of the general American procedural law. By that
token, it seems that any argument that the court may not act sua sponte
as to charging the jury before they retire to the juryroom is at least as
dubious as the Jeffersonian proposition that the common law was that
of pre-Norman, Anglo Saxon England.
Suffice the foregoing to suggest the depths to this subject which
merit study much deeper than that here possible. But here a challenger
might point out, with a great deal of important opinion on his side, that
"You are never going to get anywhere with Instructions, because the general verdict of a jury is based on fact, law, and goodness knows what else--anyway. Trial by general jury verdict is
a crude tool. There is no use trying to apply precision tests to a
machine that works to such broad tolerances. It reminds one of
the old steam engine test, where a piston was considered to fit if a
thin dime would barely slide between the piston and the cylinder
wall. The special verdict is the only solution, and for it one doesn't
need any instructions on the law."289
That argument is just about as important as it could be, considering
the fa.ct that it is not the least bit helpful. It may nevertheless be conceded that if, in any given written-instructions-jurisdiction, an all out
effort were made to fit a statutory or rule-made special verdict into the
procedural system, it would not take long to do so. The effort spent
during any trial term month by lawyers and judges in such state would
probably amount to the total of man-hour effort necessary to produce
a workable special verdict plan. Nevertheless, it would still be necessary to persuade the courts and the parties to use it, since to make its
use absolutely mandatory would be unwise if not impossible from a
variety of standpoints.
As to its voluntary use, many would not like it by its very sound;
special verdicts have long had a bad name in some states. The common
law special verdict came to stand for utter and confusing technicality;
289 The "quotation" is merely hypothetical, but follows the arguments to be seen in,
e.g., Sunderland, "An Appraisal of English Procedure, 50 A.B.A. REP. 242 at 254 ff.
(1925); Sunderland, "Modem English Legal Practice," 4 Tmr. L. REv. 273 at 288 (1925);
and literature collected in VANDEltBILT, Mm:rMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 237-243 (1949). The steam-engine figure is borrowed from WEINER, THE HuMAN
UsE OF HuMAN BEINGS 115 (1954).
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some states-such as Indiana-finally outlawed it.290 Others would
not take to it by reason of its unfamiliarity. Trial specialists might have
very personal and practical reasons for shunning it; they might have no
dislike of the present general verdict which permits the jurors to decide
a bit of law "on their own" despite their limited function (in terms of
the "antique brocard") of responding to the facts. 291 On the other side
of the bench, many judges, despite their absence of personal interest
in the outcomes, might not care to have to apply the substantive law
in its fullest rigor in every kind of case.292 As to commercial matterssay a bills and notes case--few judges would hesitate. In negligence
causes, however, under a rule that requires plaintiff to prove himself
to have been "free" of contributory negligence, many completely conscientious judges would hesitate.
Looking again at the federal rules, we see that they provide for the
discretionary submission of special questions on the part of the court,
and take a considerable step in the sophisticated direction of separating
fact and law by that means when it is deemed applicable and appropriate.293 Since there is as yet no conceivable way to separate types of
cases, even in terms of the broad concepts such as contract, tort, and the
like, for the purposes of applying distinct procedural methods, judicial
discretion is indispensable. 294 No code or rule could predetermine what
kinds of cases should be used for ordinary general verdicts, nor which
200 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §2-2022; 3 LoWE, Wou's lm>IANA PRACTICE
§55.2, p. 428 (1950). Under prior law see Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. L. R. Co, v.
Spencer, 98 Ind. 186 (1884). Generally, see Sco-rr, FUNDAMENTALS OF PROCEDURE IN
ACTIONS .AT LAw 95 (1922).
291 See Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135 at 149, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 at 1013 (1670).
''But this conventional brocard cannot be taken as a trustworthy guide to the solution of
any particular controversy on the subject. . • ." 9 WIGMORB, EvmBNOB, 3d ed., §2549
(1940); Fun.1> AND KAPLAN, MATERIALS Fon A BAsrc CounsB IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 608
(1953).
292Wyzanski, "A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility," 65 HAnv. L. RBv. 1281
at 1284 (1952).
20a Soon-, FUNDAMENTALS oF PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAw 89 (1922); Sereni,
"Basic Features of Civil Procedure in Italy," 1 AM. J. CoMP. L. 372 at 374 (1952).
"Continental jurists have recognized franl<ly that the separation of law and fact in jury
procedure is chimerical." Seagle in 4 ENOYcr.. OF THE SoCIAL SCIENCES 498 at 500 (1932).
294 Judge Wyzanski, note 296 supra, indicates that his policy as to summation of the
facts varies greatly with the type of case. He does not suggest that there is any possible
way in which the varying scope of the duty might be codified. Goodhart reminds us that
in England there has come about a " ••• virtual abolition of the jury in all civil actions
which are not concerned with the personal reputation of the litigants ••." ["Current Judicial Reform in England," 27 N.Y. Umv. L. REv. 395 at 407 (1952)] but nowhere has
there been found the suggestion that the judicial duty may be codified and specified so
that there is a blueprint of the duties as to instruction for each type of action.
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should require special questions. The great and encompassing virtue
of the federal rules pattern is that it does indeed respect the need for
judicial discretion.
It is therefore believed sensible to accept it as a fact that the general
verdict trial by jury will outlive us all; it is an institution not likely to
be changed in its general outlines in the foreseeable future. The task
is taken to be that of making it reasonably accessible to litigants, following the principle that "justice delayed is justice denied," and seeking the maximum of finality for judgments based on jury verdicts.
Many more questions than can be suggested here have been raised
in the course of the four-year inquiry which this paper concludes, but
one's time must be considered "up." At risk of seeming offensively trite,
however, one might suggest that it is sometimes forgotten, apparently,
that judges are "people"; they are human. No human can be expected
to assume a heavy burden of responsibility unless he has some authority
with which to enforce that responsibility. To apply that copybook
maxim-like truth to the charge and its adequacy, one may ask, how can
a court whose very right to instruct sua sponte is only grudgingly recognized, which cannot speak except to read from the pages of a stilted,
presettled series of requests, be expected to carry a heavy duty to charge
upon the law "fully"?
A mandatory duty to charge, under such conditions, makes for
many technical appeals, and its bad effect in that respect is hardly compensated by any good it may do. To suggest that the "conditions" be
changed is not to propose an immediate solution. The first paper in
this group contains ample evidence that the campaign to restore the
trial judge's powers is a slow, uphill fight, that no miracles in this
respect are likely to occur.295 To the contrary, the American "trammeled conditions of jury trial" are encysted in custom and habits of
thought, and further engirded by constitutions, statutes and precedents.
A long "war" may be expected before widespread change takes place.
How then may this duty be enforced if it is not subject to mandate
unless the trial judge has some modicum of authority commensurate
with the duty? The question may be answered by another: what does
a conscientious, professional judge seek to do in his charge, regardless
295 The first paper in this series, herein cited throughout as 27 TEMPLE L.Q. 137,
found that in the last quarter-century of concerted movement to restore certain of the trial
judge's traditional powers, an actual change in that direction had been effected only in
Maryland.
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of the rules or system in force? He tries to insure, in every way available to him, that the charge is complete and clear, of course. He does
so because that is his professional, personal duty-and quite regardless
of what the legislature has said he must do. That duty is ethical, nonlegal perhaps, but the only form of duty that benefits the litigants and
the jurors instead of burdening them. 296 Thus, answering a question
raised earlier: is it a duty?-the answer is of course affirmative. The
fact that the duty lies more in the moral than the strict legal field makes
it no less respectable. Its nature does, however, underscore again (as if
that were needed) the importance to the American trial system of
constant striving toward improvement in judicial selection and provision
for judicial tenure.

Some Simple Fundamentals
Despite the wide variety of systems which we have explored, we see
that the essential principles of a system making for adequacy of the
charge are few. The first requisite is a thoroughly professional judge,
whose own ethics and devotion to duty serve as a safeguard for the
adequacy of the charge-and in a fashion no rule of legislature or
court could approach. He should also have discretionary power; he
should be free to do or say anything of a judicial nature which is of aid
to the inquiry before him-provided always that he may not impinge
upon the independence of the jurors or influence them unfairly. He
must have freedom as to the manner in which he gives the charge, and
should have ingrained in himself a high respect for the necessity of
delivering (not merely reciting) to the jurors orally ( with such repetition and emphasis as is necessary for the communication of thought) a
fair understanding of the issues of the cause, the questions of fact which
they are to determine, and the principles of law applicable to the various
possible finding of fact.
The second requisite consists of able counsel. They should be
diligent to request that the court give a reasonable number of instructions, but be aware of the fact that the assimilative capacity of jurors is
limited, especially as to unfamiliar principles of law. As officers of the
court, counsel should assist the court in every way possible, but feel
29 6 But see Connecticut: ". • . at the annual meeting of the judges of the superior
court on June 5, 1950, it was voted to adopt [the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the A.B.A.]
and print them in the Practice Book. See THE CoNNECTICUT PRACTICE BooK OF 1951
15-23. New Jersey: the said Canons are part and parcel of the rules. See I WALTLINGER,
NEW JERSEY PRACTICE 287-300 (1954).
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obliged (quite apart from any rules) to make timely, pointed (but not
contentious) objection to any error of omission or commission inadvertent or otherwise, in connection with the charge to the jury.
If the court instructs orally, at the close of the evidence, with the
cooperation of counsel, and in accordance with the ethics of his office
and under the conditions described, the charge should by any standard
be adequate. That ideal may :QOt be easy of achievement everywhere
but is that not-if we are bound to do justice-simple and fundamental?

